In a previous article, Marching Below Critical Mass, I explained some of the British Army’s problems and how Fighting Power has been allowed to erode over the past 35 years. The publication Government’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 (SDR 25) has been delayed, pending the production of a new National Security Strategy. In light of the delay, there is an opportunity to examine what the ideal Land Force of tomorrow should look like.

Change

If you ask most military experts about modern battlefield tactics, they will tell you that whilst the nature of war has not changed (a contest of wills that is both violent and unpredictable), the character of warfare has changed beyond recognition. Recent conflicts in Armenia, the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine all prove this observation. The rise and adoption of new technologies has revolutionised how soldiers must fight, firstly just to survive and secondly, to win. The same experts might then go on to suggest that without significant change and investment, a regular British Army Battle Group or Brigade would find it hard to compete against an enemy that had adopted such new technology and tactics. It would risk being defeated in short order. It is clear the British Army is in need of major transformation.

Understanding Transformation

The word transformation is banded around a lot in the function of both businesses and government. Leaders talk of the need to embrace change and to transform, but rarely is this either explained, understood or executed to anything like the standard required. In fact, the best transformations normally take place unintentionally, when no one notices until afterwards that their organisation has completely changed. Ironically, this actually happened to the bulk of the British Army between 2007 and 2014, when the organisation adapted to new the demands posed by the post 9/11 circumstances of the period. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a combination of an elusive and cunning adversary and the weapons and technologies used against the Army, forced them to change their structures and tactics. The availability of new high tech equipment such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), satellite based communications, sensors that dominate the Electro Magnetic Spectrum, use of the Global Positioning System and smarter weapon systems meant that transformation was a necessity. As a Battle Group commander in Afghanistan in 2010, I had much of this technology and changed tactics at my disposal and used it much the time, doing things differently and successfully. Yet after these campaigns, a pivot back to traditional armoured warfare was demanded, without understanding that the character of warfare had changed and would continue to change. Although the Iraq and Afghan campaigns were not going to represent all aspects of future conflicts, they signposted both a strong indication as to where warfare was heading and held the seed corn of ideas for the transformation required. The point is that the British Army could have continued its own transformation, starting in 2014. Eleven years later, the penny has finally dropped.  

Game Changers

The introduction of these new combat technologies was first observed in the Gulf War of 1991, where it was said that the US Military had gone through a Revolution in Military Affairs. The 15 year period between the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the Gulf War was a time when the US Military went through a huge transformation which demonstrated their unrivalled new capability on the battlefield. It was, indeed, game changing. Going forward to today’s situation, for both Russian and Ukrainian forces, a similar transformation has occurred, yet as a matter of necessity during high intensity conflict. And so today, it is recognised that successful tactical combat is achieved with sophisticated integration of essential new technologies that are becoming smarter and more lethal as we speak, and so too are the counter measures to defeat them. This requires the employment of UAS on a vast scale for multiple uses, and at all levels, along with all the communication systems that control them. This new combat also requires the use of integrated air defence, of active defence systems for armoured vehicles, of the use of mastering and dominating the Electro Magnetic Spectrum (such as Electronic Warfare to jam and deceive), and the use of smart, long range missiles. All this has to be integrated with the more traditional capabilities of infantry, armour and artillery. There is evidence that in the British Army, an evolution of sorts has begun. Yet what is required is more akin to revolution.

A History Lesson 

The British Army’s missed opportunity to deliver transformation since 2014 should be compared to how the Army High Command behaved in a previous era, after the First World War (1914-1918). Having experienced how horsed cavalry were no longer an act of war on the battlefield of the previous four years, the generals then reinstated horse cavalry and returned them to a role of a bygone age. The voices of innovation, such as General ‘Boney’ Fuller and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, who had both experienced the transformation that had occurred during the four years of Western Front operations, were for the most part ignored. Sadly, their ideas were to be adopted by Hitler’s new Army of the mid 1930s, producing the tactics of Blitzkrieg. This past mistake of the leaders in the 1920s has echoes of the current situation just over a century later.

From Here to There and ‘In Quick time’

The extremely challenging circumstances of the new Trump Doctrine facing both British and European nations has now forced them to address their capability shortfalls. How could the British Army now seize the opportunity to transform to the highly capably force that is required both now and in future years? Crucially, it needs to ask the right questions. That does not start with “What does the force currently have, how is it structured and how can it change?”. Instead it should with the question, “What do we need to achieve success, and what does that look like?” It is only once this latter question has been addressed, that the first question (awareness and understanding of the current situation) can be looked at, to see that the future force may need to be fundamentally different form today’s.  

It may be that many of the changes required are, in the current financial climate, unaffordable. However, once an objective has been clearly understood and established (i.e. by answering the key question), initial transformational work, possibly of little cost, can start. This involves looking at changing structures, introducing new doctrine and tactics, and having a plan for equipment procurement (and its integration). Some of the requirements, especially the high tech systems, may need to wait for funding, or for what is called the moment for ‘Urgent Capability Requirements’ (UCRs). At least the transformation can have started and leaders can start to educate and train the force. Given today’s precarious security situation, the British Army has not a moment to lose.  

What does the Army need to achieve? 

Automation, Artificial Intelligence and further innovation in communication systems is having a profound effect on militaries. The future battlefield of autonomous systems fighting humans, and robots fighting other robots is no longer a thing of science fiction. It is happening now. As advanced technologies progress (and become cheaper through economies of scale), less and less humans will find themselves on the frontline. Whilst large numbers of personnel are still required to run, control and command this world of automation, it is clear that this robotic battlefield will be very different from the one that we even observe  today in Ukraine.  

This means there is a requirement for a new force that is structured, integrated and equipped correctly for this highly lethal, complicated and automated environment. Early outputs of SDR 25 apparently talk of the need for ten year plan to get the Armed Forces back to a state of the required capability. It will require the British Army to design and deliver a combination of cutting edge technology systems that work alongside the new digital platforms that are just coming into service, such as the AJAX, Challenger III, new Artillery systems (both close and deep), Boxer and the new Apache 64-E Attack Helicopter. These new digital platforms need to be integrated and employed as far down as at company (sub-unit) and at battle group level (unit), something that of course happened on the deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Holding them as divisional assets will just not work. And the tactics and use of these fully integrated platforms will fundamentally change. Gone would be the military principle of ‘Concentration of Force’ (because the concentrating tanks, vehicles, equipment and troops become vulnerable to instant destruction when massed together). In comes the need for improved survivability, increased stealth and deception, and things like sophisticated surveillance and target acquisition plans, stealth. Camouflage and concealment and the spreading out of platforms becomes the new reality. That will be hard to achieve, but there seem few alternatives.

What might that look like for a ‘New Model Army’?  

In order for the Army to achieve this, a balanced, integrated force of identical combat brigades (perhaps a new name is needed, such as ‘Tactical Task Groups’; this can help when transforming) are needed. They must be formed out of the chaos of the current, incoherent and different brigades (there are currently eleven different types of brigade). Each Tactical Task Group would have a combination of Armour (CR3), Armoured Cavalry (Ajax), Armoured Infantry (Boxer), Light Mech Infantry (Mastiff/Foxhound or other), Light Infantry and even a Ranger (Special Operations) Regiment allocated to it, along with the integration of the new technologies required and support elements, such as Electronic Warfare Squadrons. It is possible to make around eight of these new groups out of current resources, split over two newly structured and identical ‘Smart Divisions’. It means breaking apart both current structures, but also rewriting doctrine and tactics with this new, smart, integrated and flexible force. This could be achieved through low cost, internal reorganisation, something the Army is very good at. The only real pain points would be in some leader’s heads who might be opposed to such transformation. As Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart said, “There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”

Levers for Change

To carry out this transformation, it is not just the tactical structures and technology that needs to change. Transformation needs to be championed, sponsored, explained and managed. To do this, changes will be required at higher levels of management, and across what the Army call all ‘the Lines of Development’. These include additional changes to career systems, training, logistics and infrastructure. Using extant Army resources and departments in different ways would be essential to deliver the changes required. The following are some ideas of how this could be achieved:

a.             Creation of a Three Star Transformation Command. Transformation of this scale and change requires senior ownership and a strategic plan. Hence the need for a Three Star Transformation Command Headquarters. This could be created by using part of the current Field Army Headquarters and giving it the Land Warfare Centre (LWC) (the collective training organisation that trains troops for readiness and deployments). LWC is currently owned and managed by Field Army Headquarters. This would allow the transformation to be managed from design through to the training system. Transformation Command would link up with a newly formed Dstl Army Technology Group and they would work hand in hand from horizon scanning technologies and trends, through to design of new defence systems, ready for handing over to Army HQ to deliver through a reformed Defence and Equipment Support (DE&S) organisation.  

b.             Uplift to the Four Star Army Headquarters (Head Office). At the highest level, the Army is run through its four Star Army Headquarters (HQ), based near Andover and with a small forward element in the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. Over the past ten years, under the ‘New Army Operating Model’ Army HQ has been reduced in size, departments reorganised and its roles have been changed multiple times (giving it more tasks than before, handing some tasks off to other HQs, but without enough understanding or resource to get the jobs done). These change initiatives have been largely unsuccessful, with huge implications for the Army it manages. In summary, what is required is for the Army’s Head Office (Army HQ) is to take back some of the staff resource and responsibilities from HQ Field Army, making it a coherent, well resourced and knowledge based Head Office.

c.             Empower the UK’s Three Star Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) HQ. This Three Star HQ is a NATO Multi-National HQ, but commanded mostly resourced and staffed with British Army personnel. As it is the one functioning Three Star Corps HQ that the British Army has, it would seem sensible to formally delegate the command and control of the Army’s regular deployable field troops (two divisions and enabling organisations) to an active Corps HQ such as HQ ARRC, as opposed to the current owner, Field Army Headquarters. HQ ARRC would command this paper’s proposed two identical divisions, as well as their own corps capabilities. Given the political importance of HQ ARRC, it would have to remain multi-national and part of NATO’s deployment plan. Thus, it could take on other NATO formations and units as it currently does.

d.             Disband Field Army HQ. As with any change that ‘costs neutral’, so resource must be taken from other areas. If the roles of the current Field Army HQ were handed over to a combination of Army HQ, HQ ARRC and Transformation Command, then there would be no need for Field Army HQ; its roles would be carried out by the suggested three HQs.

e.             Implement an Army Industrial Strategy. People have talked about creating Land Industrial Strategies for over 25 years. To date, it has never worked in a comprehensive way. The Army (through the Chief of the General Staff CGS)), needs to own this function, and hence the need to call it ‘The Army Industrial Strategy’, not ‘Land’ or anything else. This approach will demand the onshoring (design, development and production) of the vast majority of essential weapon and defence systems that the Army will need. A new relationship with DE&S will be required, but the orders and instructions must come from Army HQ, without the friction, confusion and delays caused by the current relationship between the two organisations and the added friction of the Joint Force in the Ministry of Defence. This would require an Army Three Star Officer at DE&S to work directly for, and be accountable to CGS (i.e. not in the Joint Force chain of command of the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall).  

f.               Expansion of the Army Reserves. With an Army of just 72,000 regular personnel and only 30,000 Army Reservists, there is little resilience built into the system. Given the combination of the precarious and unpredictable global security situation of today and limited appetite for increases to funding Army Transformation, it seems like an obvious conclusion that the Army Reserves should be both expanded in number and given a credible command structure that could, in times of conflict, rapidly mobilise a second Corps HQ with Reserve troops allocated and also be able to deal with internal security threats and challenges. This Reserve also needs resourcing and training, something that is lacking at the moment. An increase in the Reserve force to at least 100,000 (that are at different levels of readiness) would appear to be an efficient and effective way to build in long term resilience.

Summary 

There are no easy answers for how the British Army deals with the unprecedented change that is occurring, alongside the deteriorating geo-political situation. However, the past ten years demonstrate that doing more of the same and continuing to manage decline in the same way is the worst of all options. Given the delay in the publication of SDR25, there is now an opportunity to think again about what a transformed Army should be able to achieve and deliver. Army planners need to think in terms of revolution, not evolution. Whilst this will require painful changes and a degree of risk, the alternative of accepting a Land Force that is unable to compete on the battlefield is unthinkable.

Author: Harry Fullerton OBE

Col Fullerton OBE

Col Fullerton OBE served in the British Army for 28 years. He was the Commanding Officer of the Household Cavalry Regiment between 2008 and 2011, which included a six month operational tour in Afghanistan. In his last post, Col Fullerton served as Assistant Head of Directorate Combat in Army Headquarters.