To truly understand just how and why the British Army is in so much trouble with Ajax, it is necessary to examine the situation and poor decision-making of the past 23 years.

In the following article, guest writer Colonel (Retd) Harry Fullerton OBE provides a unique account of his experience of that time:

Black Bag and Main Building

In the autumn of 2003, it was time for a new military posting, which was often referred to as a major’s ‘Black Bag’ appointment. The name Black Bag was a throwback to the days when officers working at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Main Building in Whitehall would carry their official work in a traditional black leather MoD satchel, accompanied with the signature bowler hat and furled umbrella. Whilst we had lost the black satchel, brolly and bowler, sadly many of the bad behaviours of old remained. Jobs in MoD Main Building were mostly about long term policy, strategy, funding and requirements. Staff Officer Grade 2s (SO2) (majors, or the equivalent rank) were the workhorses for a great deal of the staff effort that ensued, but not the decision makers. As the main junior rank of Main Building, you quickly got to know your place in the deeply hierarchical MoD structures and a culture all of its own. The jobs were an essential posting in a military career path and it was important over the next two years to be loyal to the system. Behaviours in MoD Main Building meant sticking to party lines, working hard and not ruffling any feathers, such as questioning a policy. It was no mistake that you were in a staff job, as opposed to a command appointment. These jobs lasted for two years, just long enough to get good at the job, but not long enough to ensure the successful continuity that large, longtime and complex programmes and policies required.

Not so Smart Procurement

My new role was to work on the current tank and armoured vehicle capability development, in a department called Directorate Direct Battlefield Engagement or ‘DEC DBE’ for short. I shared an office with another major, who had the unenviable role of SO2 FRES (see more below). We were there to develop the requirements, (for example, an upgrade to a tank, or a new one), to look at options, and to find and justify the funding. The name of the department tended to change every three to four years, as the military went through multiple restructuring initiatives, but the job did not, (in my time, we were renamed to Directorate Ground Manoeuvre). I had experience and a good technical knowledge of armoured vehicles. In addition to operating in light recce tanks (Scorpions and Scimitars), main battle tanks (Chieftains and Challengers), FV430s and even Ferret Scout Cars, the first of my two years at the UK Defence Academy had been spent on learning Defence Technology and the MoD’s latest procurement system, aptly named Smart Procurement. Sadly this was a term that was ridiculed by those of us who knew what really went on, as there was little about the new initiative that was smart.

War in Iraq 2003

Six months prior to my posting, in the Spring of 2003, the invasion of Iraq began. The bold ‘Shock and Awe’ doctrine of the US-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime had worked, and at the time it looked to many, including myself, as though the occupation of Iraq and the subsequent handover to the Iraqi government might go relatively smoothly. The assumption back then was that British troops and their armoured vehicles and equipment, mainly centred in the south around the southern city of Basra would be extracted back to the UK and Germany – job done as such, or “Mission Accomplished” as President George ‘Doubleya’ Bush had proclaimed on board the USS Abraham Lincoln on the 1st of May 2003. Sadly, this illusion of victory and the plans for the region were about to be hit by a new civil war between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish Iraqis and an Iranian backed insurgency, whose main target would be US and UK Forces. This would have huge implications both for the Army and the Ministry of Defence, and, as it turned out, for my armoured role in Directorate Ground Manoeuvre.

Trouble in Basra

In the southern Iraqi city of Basra, which was controlled and commanded by a UK led and mostly UK resourced Multi-National Division, a form of insurgency had taken hold and a similar situation (though even more complex) was growing further north in Baghdad for US Forces. This was quite different from the war fighting phase during the invasion. Gone were the conventional enemy of the Iraqi Armed Forces and in their place came the irregulars and insurgents. On the 24th of June 2003, a detachment of Royal Military Policemen had been murdered by an angry crowd of demonstrators, in what was later called the Battle of Majar al-Kabir. At the same time, the first contacts between British Forces and insurgents had begun. More significantly and a little later, the first use of an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) on a British Army civilian style 4×4 vehicle had been used by insurgents, killing an Army officer. This was the beginning of a new conflict. IEDs targeted at vehicles would be responsible for many of the fatalities and casualties. To start with, these incidents were not identified as game changing events. Few people, less those in deep intelligence back in the UK, could predict the change and understand the possible consequences. This was the start of a new campaign that would last for the six years in Iraq. From 2006, a similar thing followed in Afghanistan.

Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR)

Now the department I worked for had done its job to support the invasion of Iraq by ensuring that the troops had the right equipment and enhancements to get the war fighting job done, and by and large, this had worked. Although done at the eleventh hour before H Hour (mostly due to the duplicitous manner in which the UK Military were sent to war), armoured vehicles had been supplied with additional armour packs for ballistic protection against Russian made Iraqi tanks, such as the T72. Engines had been modified to cope with the heat and dust of desert conditions and new camouflage nets had been provided; all for protection against Saddam Hussein’s armoured divisions. These enhancements were known as Urgent Operational Requirements or UORs, which circumvented the long and tortuous Smart Procurement process (which could take up to ten years), to deliver the capability in a short period for a specific need. UORs were only authorised by the Government in times of unexpected conflict, where a military capability gap had been identified, as the assumption was that the longer-term Defence budget would cover the ‘expected wars’, such as that predicted during the Cold War. However, the UOR process in general was disliked by the MoD, officials in the Treasury and Foreign Office, as it necessitated short cuts, it disposed of commercial competition and had less accountability and less thought for longer term equipment integration and sustainability. It also required new capital spend from outside the MoD budget, as these were costs not anticipated in the long term MoD Equipment Plan. On the benefits side, it allowed soldiers to go into combat with a better chance of winning and surviving.

Window Closes

Now the time window for the use of the UOR process for the Second Gulf War was effectively closed the moment Basra City was liberated in April 2003. The assumption was that the war was over and troops would be home soon. It therefore came as a bit of a shock and a great distraction to MoD Main Building in Whitehall when, as the insurgency started some five months later and as troops found themselves in more combat than they had done during the invasion, there was a call for new weapons and equipment to combat the growing threats. This posed a huge problem for the Ministry. “It was not supposed to be like that” was the general assumption. The optimistic plan was for a successful withdrawal and peaceful, rapid handover to Iraqi Forces, so that troops could return to Germany and the UK and continue to operate as they had before. This assumption is what is often called, ‘Success Based Planning’, where everything must go right and according to the friendly force plan. Sadly, the enemy had a vote. They saw an opportunity and voted otherwise.

The Folly of the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)

Running concurrent to both the build up to and the invasion of Iraq was a new and ambitious, long term armoured vehicle programme, called the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), which aimed to provide the British Army with much needed new tanks and armoured vehicles (about 4,000 in total), all built around a common chassis (which would, in theory, reduce long term costs and allow for commonality of logistics) and using new technologies, such as electric drive and novel lightweight, high tech, modular, high tech armour, (providing more protection for less weight).
This technology drive initiative had originally stemmed from the US Army’s lead and desire to develop a similar range of armoured vehicles. For the UK, the experience of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s more successful Small Wars in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone, where rapid effect of getting boots on the ground early appeared to be one of the key contributors to success. Yet an even faster light armoured intervention might actually prevent conflict starting at all. This was also a time when the British Army needed to replace some, but not all of its armoured vehicles. There had been a history over the past 20 years before this of failed armoured programmes, including a new and much needed reconnaissance vehicle, TRACER (Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement), which never got past initial demonstrators, and the infantry’s disastrous Saxon vehicle procurement.
As a strategic concept for the Army, FRES was an innovative approach. Sadly it was the wrong innovation. The aim for the system was that it would be rapidly deployable (hence rapid effects) in RAF transport aircraft, such as the C130 Hercules, and at the time the yet to be built A400M Aircraft, that could land on rugged airstrips. To be rapidly deployable meant that the tank or armoured vehicle would have to weigh no more than 20 tonnes and the equivalent current armoured vehicles of the time ranged from 30-50 tonnes. To get down to this new weight, not only would the armour have to be ultra-lightweight for the same ballistic protection level, but it would also have to be modular, meaning that much of the armour would have to be flown in a separate aircraft (therefore more aircraft required) and fitted to the vehicle once it had landed. This rapid deployment would complement the sorts of operation that had been experienced over the past three years, where the principle was that if you could get tanks and armoured vehicles into a conflict early, you could have a better chance of preventing a war from growing and a chance to deliver the conditions for peace and stability. Thus, the FRES programme was on message for the ‘Force for Good’ strapline for both Government and Defence. However, the demanding technology requirements meant this was uncharted waters, holding plenty of risk.
Having political top cover for a large, multi-billion-pound capital programme is essential and the Army finally thought they had found it in FRES. That political top cover secures the money required in the long term Equipment Plan. Those in charge of the Army liked the idea of a large capital programme as it allowed, from their perspective, to compete with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, who traditionally had the lion’s share of the capital budget for submarines, ships and aircraft. Once Senior Army Officers, many who had never served in procurement jobs and had little technical and acquisition knowledge, were convinced of FRES, every Army Staff Officer in Main Building and beyond was informed of its perceived benefits and how important it was for the future of the Army. There was an Army party line to take, and it was not to be questioned. Groupthink was hard at work. Questioning the FRES Programme was something that only staff officers with either firm ethical principles, great moral courage or little ambition would consider.
At this very same time, the Army was in the process of digitising its entire tactical communication systems, which was to have its own problems (that is another procurement story). It was another friction to add into the mix of an Army that was deployed on operations and wanting to replace its armoured fleet.

One Failed Programme to the Next

Whilst I was not working directly for the FRES Programme, I was working on all the other in-service tanks and armoured vehicles, many of which would be replaced by the new FRES fleet; thus, I was a stakeholder and held responsibility for the maintenance of the current tank and armoured capability. As a result of the announcement of FRES, a programme called TRACER was officially closed down, resulting in the extension in service and upgrade of the Combat Vehicle Recce Tracked (CVRT) fleet (Scimitars and other variants). To further fund FRES, a successful and collaborative armoured vehicle programme for the infantry (Multi Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) Boxer), that after ten years was about to enter production, was cancelled, thus delaying the introduction of a new wheeled armoured personnel carrier, with over £200m in sunk costs.
So, the funding for MRAV Boxer and TRACER, along with new promised funds, was switched to the new, ‘on message’, FRES programme. All appeared rosy, not realising the risks and time delays that the decision makers were imposing on future Army capability. Sadly, beneath the big hand, small map mentality, along with the poor situational awareness of what was really going on (the growing conflict in Iraq, the lack of knowledge of what technologies could offer at the time), and their group think, it was a decision that would cost the Army and the country dear.

Something’s not Right

In the MoD, once a capital programme such as FRES has got political support and military inertia, it is very difficult to stop or even question, no matter what the evidence says. And that is where I found myself; questioning and challenging the key Army programme that I considered had so many flaws. After listening to FRES concept briefings, technology aspirations and Defence Industry suggestions, I concluded from my own military education and armoured experience, that this programme was going to fail. I started to talk to my fellow staffers, finding every point of view, from those who agreed with me, to those that were indifferent to those who, no matter what you showed in evidence, were not prepared to voice their concerns to senior officers. The higher up the staffing chain I went, the stronger the support for FRES became. However, it was clear, on several levels, that the programme was doomed. This is not a case of saying “Hindsight is a wonderful thing.” The evidence was crystal clear back then and it is worth explaining why this was the case. Embracing the FRES slogan “Go Early, Go Light, Go Home” was what each staff officer was meant to think and told to broadcast. Alternatively, labelling FRES as “Go Light, Die Early”, risked the chance of being a career-terminating choice of words. The question was how to challenge the FRES narrative and that required evidence.

FRES – Defying the Laws of Physics

The promised technology for FRES that would deliver a lighter, more agile armoured fighting vehicle was not yet either ready or proven. The MoD had Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of 1-7, one being “it’s just been conceived as an idea” to seven being technology that is “oven ready”. For starters, the intent was that the new vehicles would be powered with a form of hybrid electric/diesel drive, a technology for tanks that in 2003 was very immature and not proven. Secondly, the promise of novel, light materials and technologies to protect the new vehicles from being penetrated by enemy weapon systems was again very immature and whilst new technologies looked promising, they would ultimately prove difficult to integrate, not good enough or not of a high enough TRL for service in the next decade. The lightweight concept was thus flawed. Effectively, decision makers had been seduced by the Defence Industry, scientists and the ambitious US Army approach (which had much more resource and research), with their claims of what could be achieved. Twenty-two years later (2025), these immature technologies have yet to make it into any armoured vehicles, anywhere in the world in significant numbers.

FRES’s Scale and Ambition

The second issue was one of scale and over ambition. The target of the FRES fleet programme was 4,000 armoured vehicles, replacing many obsolete vehicles, but also many, such as the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Warrior, that was considered a highly capable armoured vehicle that had at least another twenty years life left, (and it was to prove invaluable in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next ten years). However, in the rush to order this new FRES fleet, Warrior had to go. It was a mistake that would only be rectified when it became clear to senior officers how much capability there was in Warrior, as it proved the stalwart of combat operations and underpinned Armoured Infantry doctrine. Elsewhere, in the drive to move to one modern, lightweight configurable chassis for all armoured vehicles, the sheer numbers of 4,000 vehicles were going to make the programme unaffordable (one only had to do the maths).
FRES – No Joined Dots….
Thirdly, although the FRES programme was officially a joint programme, (meaning it was being organised and procured by the whole of Defence, not just the Army), it was essentially an Army initiative. However, given that the concept was to deploy much of this fleet of armour to combat operations by military aircraft, there was a huge flaw in the concept of operations, as the RAF did not have nearly enough strategic and tactical lift aircraft, such as the C17, C130 Hercules and the future A400M, to deploy the force rapidly onto the ground. Furthermore, the global reach of the aircraft, once loaded with FRES armoured vehicles, would be drastically reduced. The RAF never signed up to the FRES concept. The inter-Service rivalry meant that it was not in the interest of the RAF to support the FRES concept, even if they did have enough aircraft, as the huge multi-billion pound cost of FRES would eat into the Defence procurement budget at a time when the RAF needed the same funds for new aircraft and upgrades to old ones. FRES may have had Prime Minister top cover, but it was going nowhere without the support of the boys in light blue, or even dark blue, as the Royal Navy had their aircraft carriers being delivered along a similar timeframe. Inter-departmental politics were hard at work. The Army would always lose on an equipment priority basis.

Changing Events in Iraq

At the same time that FRES was emerging, changing events in Iraq that I spoke of earlier, and later in Afghanistan, meant that there was a growing need for our department to address the problem of protecting soldiers in vehicles out in the combat zones of the here and now. In 2004 and 2005, Iraqi insurgents started to ambush and destroy British Army convoys with IEDs or roadside bombs as they were commonly termed by the media. The Iraq War was becoming an inconvenient situation for longer term Army Procurement plans, as particular senior officers at the MoD capability branch, (who were mostly from the Army) knew that if the situation in Iraq kept deteriorating, then additional Treasury funds would be required to procure new specific to Iraq armoured vehicles under the previously explained UOR process. Although funds for UOR equipment would be additional and on top of the long term funds for big projects like FRES, it was clear that questions would be asked as to why the Army needed its FRES armoured vehicle programme, as well as new specific armoured vehicles for operation in Iraq. As such, leaders who were running and supporting the FRES programme saw the new Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) for Iraq as a financial threat to their programme. Whilst never consciously or deliberately obstructed support to current combat operations, they did all they could to justify and overstate the importance of FRES, not realising that they had the funds for one of these capabilities, but not both.

Snatch and the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP)

As a result of rising IED incidents and casualty figures in Iraq, the initial response from Directorate Ground Manoeuvre was to send out to Iraq large numbers of lightly armoured Snatch Land Rovers that were now not required in Northern Ireland after the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement and the cessation of hostilities. The reasoning behind sending Snatch was that it had proved itself as a highly effective armoured 4×4 in Northern Ireland and had saved lives, allowed the operators to do their job and had never been defeated by IRA attacks. Furthermore, it would not involve and large capital spend.
It appeared, at first look, like a suitable and readily available solution, certainly better than patrolling in unprotected Land Rovers. Along with the vehicle’s physical protection, jamming technologies were supplied that were designed to defeat the radio signal that initiated most IEDs, although this was slightly slower to arrive. Surely, sending these capabilities to another insurgency, this time in the Middle East, would have the same success? Sadly, this was not to be the case, as the IED threat in Iraq and later Afghanistan, would prove to be very different from Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Snatch was used only in the main cities of Northern Ireland and was not deployed in areas in the countryside, such as South Armagh, where from bitter experience, the Army knew there could be huge roadside IEDs waiting to defeat Army vehicle patrols.
The problem was that the IED threat in Southern Iraq was using a new and highly devastating explosive technique, developed by Iranian backed insurgents, which came to be known as the Explosively Formed Projectile or ‘EFP’. This warhead was made up of a copper cone, packed behind by high explosive, which when initiated, converted the solid cone into a hyper-fast moving and molten copper slug, which would penetrate pretty much all existing armour systems that the Army could field. It could slice through not just the thin armour of a Snatch Land Rover, but also that of some of our bigger armoured vehicles. To make matters worse, the IEDs were initiated using a Passive Infra-Red (PIR) sensor, which were hard to counter with jamming techniques. Other attacks using High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads from Rocket propelled Grenades (RPGs) were having the same destructive effect on our armoured vehicles. The resulting IED and RPG attacks that took place over the next three years were to have devastating consequences for the British campaign in Southern Iraq.
The lightly armoured Snatch Land Rover had been provided with the best of intentions, it seemed a clever idea (it was spare from a previous conflict where it had been successful and prevented my department from having to design and buy a new armoured vehicle, thus not threatening the FRES Programme). Yet as the insurgency in Southern Iraq turned more violent and with more lethal support coming from Iran and other areas of the Middle East, it turned out to be the wrong decision. As Union Jack covered coffins started arriving back in the UK in ever increasing numbers mainly because of EFP IEDs, so the questions started being asked about Snatch and the vulnerability of all our other armoured vehicles. It soon became a toxic issue for both the Army and for politicians. Yet the response of both senior commanders on the ground in Iraq and by the department I worked for was to reassure ministers and the public that Snatch was the only practical solution and that commanders and troops liked the vehicle for its small size and ability to get around tight urban areas, (they were not totally wrong, but they could not see the bigger picture of Snatch, where taking risks against powerful IEDs was losing the war on the home front). It was only after the attrition rate increased that commanders on the ground started calling for new solutions. Certainly, by the time Snatch was being used in Afghanistan in 2007, commanders knew the risks and tried where possible to mitigate them. Although the IED threat was fundamentally different in nature in Afghanistan, Snatch’s vulnerabilities remained.
Conflicting Programmes and Decisions: Invest in FRES or Support the Current Battle?
Tragically, the growing insurgency in Iraq and the resulting casualties was seen as both a distraction and aberration by those supporting the FRES programme. They feared that if the MoD and Army was made to spend money on new improved armoured vehicles specific for this new war in Iraq, funding for the longer-term FRES programme would be at best delayed and at worst, removed. Thus, the Army’s showcase major procurement project would be lost. This seemed counterintuitive, as these very same people championing FRES were themselves experienced commanders from previous combat operations, who would care for the life of every last soldier under their command. They were good, competent operators. Yet there was something about officers’ strange behaviours and decision making in the MoD that did not quite match how they behaved in the field or on operations.

Flawed Structures

The frictions did not stop there. The structures in the MoD were unhelpful for the task in hand to help the Land Force on current operations. My directorate (Directorate Ground Manoeuvre, ”Dec GM’) was one of the MoD’s Capability Branches, owned jointly by Defence, not by the Army. As such, although most of the Dec GM staff were Army personnel, the Army, as a separate budget holder, did not own the money, nor incredibly, did they own the requirement for new equipment for operations. It was an organisation called Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) who were responsible for requesting the right new equipment (through the UOR process). Therefore, it was their job to understand when things were going wrong and demand new equipment. Yet, as with any large organisation with multiple departments, there was confusion as to what might be going wrong, what the solution might be and who should drive the process. Additionally, many officers that reached senior command, although they were well versed in planning the fight and operating on the ground as competent combat commanders, had little experience or knowledge about Defence Technology or of the procurement process that delivered military capability, such as new armoured vehicles. So, you had this ridiculous situation where leaders with the wrong qualifications, some of whom were not even in the Army, were accountable for requesting new armoured vehicles or upgrades to them, yet thought it was someone else’s responsibility. For the Army and Defence, the left hand had no idea what the right hand was doing.
Without understanding where responsibility lies, there can be little accountability. In this case, process, behaviours, entrenched mindsets and ‘stovepipes of excellence’ had trumped output. It was utter madness and something that was only corrected when the requirement to act in Iraq became non-discretionary as a result of casualties and public perception. Longer term reform came ten years later under the Levene Reforms[1], where the Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy were given more control of their equipment programmes and the money to deliver them. It came too late for the campaigns or both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Not Invented Here

There was another problem to overcome. As this IED threat in Iraq was targeted at all vehicles, I also had a role and responsibility to enhance the armour protection on the larger armoured vehicles, such as our tracked and Infantry Fighting Vehicles, like the Warrior, which were also falling victim to IED attacks. The answer lay in procuring and fitting some battle proven armour systems that had been developed both by UK scientists and also from abroad by allied nations and partners. The UK additional armour was effective, but bulky and heavy (much of this is still classified in nature) and could only be fitted to Warriors and Challenger II tanks. The two other foreign developed technologies were Bar Armour and Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA). The problem was that these protective systems were rather looked down upon by some in the the MoD, as they were not home grown technologies. Indeed our own armour development programmes for FRES were working on more futuristics armour systems. Once again, the long term equipment plan (in this case FRES) for winning some future war, was preventing us from winning the current one. I requested with my superiors to act and use the UOR process to use these armours. Somewhat begrudgingly, common sense finally prevailed, and I was allowed to use the UOR process to fit armoured vehicles with the much-needed armour systems. Along with a couple of SO2s at the DLO and DPA (the forerunner to DE&S), we contacted the team at the armoured vehicles’ manufacturer, who were also the design authority for most of our current fleet of armoured vehicles. They designed prototype fits for the new armour systems. This took a matter of weeks, not the normal years of procurement treacle. Within a few months, the RAF were dispatching the armour on vehicles to troops in Iraq. The CVRT Scimitar got additional mine blast protection and bar armour, we upgraded the ageing FV 430 Armoured Personnel Carrier and gave it ERA (now called Bulldog), Warrior and Challenger II got enhanced armour packages. Then followed many other upgrades, from air conditioning to thermal imagers and overhead weapon stations. It was at times like these where some dedicated officers and civil servants at DE&S and scientists at Dstl delivered outstanding outputs. It was to prove lifesaving and critical for soldiers operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also to be the start for much more innovation and rapid procurement to help protect soldiers on the new front lines.
In the autumn of 2005, I was posted and my successor continued this operationally critical work, but it now started to dominate the directorate’s work and involved everyone. Whilst this start to UOR work had solved part of the problem in Iraq, the FRES programme remained the elephant in the room. Nor had this new work cracked the problem of the vulnerability of Snatch (which was not big enough to take the novel armour systems) and the casualties figures kept growing. Fortunately, change was just around the corner.

Better Decision Making Arrives – The Drayson Effect

The significant change occurred after my time in the department, when an entrepreneur, Labour Party donor and friend of the then Prime Minister, Lord Drayson, was seconded to work inside the MoD. In a drive to cut through the MoD’s red tape, confusion and bureaucracy, in 2006, Lord Drayson was appointed as the MoD’s Minister for Procurement. It was to become one of the Prime Minister’s smartest decisions. With his new responsibility, Drayson started to come under intense pressure from the public and the families of those who had been killed in Iraq, to do something more to protect soldiers in Snatch vehicles. Snatch was not just toxic, but it was beginning to turn public opinion away from the serving Labour Government. But even with Tony Blair’s open cheque book policy to procure better equipment for soldiers on operations, there seemed no way to change the department’s policy on new protected vehicles for the Iraq and Afghan campaigns. Lord Drayson summed it up by commenting that “the Army just did not know what it wanted”. He discovered the same problems that I had encountered. Eventually, Lord Drayson had just had enough of being told that there was no immediate solution, and in mid 2006 he went straight to Directorate Ground Manoeuvre and informed them that the explanations given to him on why better armoured vehicles could not be procured were not good enough. He gave instructions that the department was to find a suitable vehicle that would protect troops against the IED threat and that it was to be procured it in the right numbers and be operational on the streets of Basra within twelve months. There were to be no constraints on cost. And the department had three days to decide on a solution.

The V-Shaped Hull

It is amazing what the Army could do when it was given clear instructions and the resources to do it. It’s where the Army thrives. The Ground Manoeuvre team exceeded all expectations. A small team of dedicated experts, headed up by an experienced and no-nonsense Colonel, got straight to work. After a 72-hour whistle stop global tour to visit vehicle manufacturers, they came back with a decision. The result was that by Christmas 2006, the MoD procured and delivered to Iraq a wheeled, armoured personnel carrier (the Cougar), which the British would call the Mastiff, known for its novel, shallow V-Shaped hull and raised hull (large ground clearance), giving optimum protection against both side and underbelly IEDs. This US manufactured vehicle had V-shaped and raised hull had been developed and used by the South African Army during their wars in Angola and Mozambique from the late 1960s to the 1980s. One of the greatest threats back then was from Soviet made anti-tank mines that were causing many fatalities. The South African Army needed a specific solution in short order.
Now because there was an international arms embargo on South Africa in response to the apartheid system, the South African military had to start vehicle designs from scratch and use South African companies and their own scientists and experts. So large international defence companies were not able to offer the South Africans their own vehicle designs (which would not have been suitable to the anti-mine requirement). This is where innovation can thrive, because there is no baggage or requirement or pressure to use unsuitable systems that defence salesmen were offering. The staggering thing was that, at the time in the 1980s, no one in either the US nor Europe thought it necessary to consider buying such capable V-shaped vehicles and hence all armoured vehicles in the West were designed with lower ground clearance and flat-bottomed hulls (as the perceived threat was from direct fire). It was only when the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns kicked off that the West started understanding why the South Africans had such vehicles.
Of course, there is a trade-off to be had with a vehicle that has a V-shaped hull. It is hard to make a tracked vehicle with the V-shape, (due to the running gear and tracks) and the vehicle will be higher up (and therefore more exposed to direct fire weapons). It also makes the vehicle less stable, as more weight is place higher up. This links back to armoured vehicle trade-offs and the Survivability Onion. But for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this was a justified compromise. More recently, vehicles such as these have also performed well on the front line in the Ukraine War.

Further British Innovation

On its own, Mastiff was not going to cope with some of the powerful Iraqi EFPs. To give more protection, Mastiff’s side armour was then considerably enhanced by complex armour packs, designed by innovative British Defence Scientists at Dstl. Added to this, the bar armour (a US and Israeli innovation that we had introduced to be put on Scimitars and Bulldogs) was welded to the outside. Later, a smaller four wheeled version of the vehicle, called Ridgeback was introduced. Together, along with other new vehicles such as Wolfhound and Husky, (all with Dstl input), these vehicles would be known as ‘the Dogs of War’, which would have a game changing effect on saving lives and allowing the British mission in both Iraq and later, Afghanistan to continue. Yet these vehicles were despised by many, who saw them as irrelevant, agricultural level machinery that had no role in their future force, and threatened the FRES Programme.

Accountability for FRES – No Recognition of Mistakes

Whilst the FRES Programme was never publicly shelved or cancelled, due to the longevity and cost of both the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, programme became smaller and less ambitious. The FRES name morphed to the Medium Weight Concept and then the Trials of Truth (where in deep irony, the three vehicles to compete were the UK cancelled Boxer and two other 8-wheeled armoured vehicles). At each name change, the ambition got less, but no one ever stood up and admitted that the FRES Programme was officially cancelled and no one was ever held accountable. Most involved were promoted to further jobs, many in armoured vehicle procurement, only adding to the problems.

2012: Ten Years Later – The FRES Legacy: Ajax is Born

My time in military procurement in MoD Main Building was not the only time when I experienced the Army getting armoured vehicle procurement wrong. Fast forward to 2012 and I found myself working in Army HQ. Call it a curse or not, but as an Assistant Director in the ‘Capability Combat Directorate’ I found myself responsible for the Army’s ‘Mounted Close Combat’ (in other words, responsible for pretty much all armoured vehicles). These were interesting times. The campaign in Helmand Province was not going well and there was a plan in place for the whole of the Province to be handed over to the USMC. As the operational drawdown commenced, so many of the UOR armoured vehicles (Dogs of War) began to arrive back in the UK, yet there was no support funding for these vehicles, nor was there an appetite to use them, seeing as they were not perceived to be appropriate for classical armoured warfare.
Over time, the equipment spend of UORs in both campaigns had tested the Treasury’s patience (noting that the Government’s Austerity Programme post the financial crisis of 2008 was in full swing). In effect, they demanded a payback from an Army that wanted both the extra UOR capital investment for the unanticipated wars and the full entitlement of long term funds for the potential wars they planned to prepare for in the future. Such a comfortable financial situation was never going to last. The surviving funds for the ill fated FRES programme were put towards a new armoured vehicle programme to replace the aging CVRT reconnaissance vehicles, that to date (2025) is only just entering service, but with many problems. Originally called ‘Scout’ and later ‘Ajax’, this programme aimed at finally delivering a large, tracked armoured vehicle to deliver the armoured reconnaissance role for armoured brigades. The problem was that it was just too big to have any stealth and its huge size (40 tonnes as opposed to Scimitar’s final upgraded weight of 15 tonnes) meant it had to be tracked. The designs for it looked not that dissimilar to the Warrior armoured infantry vehicle (that carried seven infantrymen in the hull). We all wondered why it needed to be quite so big.

Procurement Decisions

Just as things looked as though they could not get any worse, the decision was made by the procurement agency (DE&S) to award the contract not to the only viable British armoured vehicle manufacturer left, BAE Land Systems (who had a tried and tested contender, the CV90 and who also owned the design and technology behind the new UK/French 40mm cannon that had been chosen separately), but to a US Defence company, General Dynamics (UK). They offered a Spanish/Austrian built chassis (ASCOD 2) and a concept of fitting a new turret on it, with the BAE Land Systems 40mm cannon. The turret then was sub-contracted to be made by Lockheed Martin (UK). To compound these ill judged procurement decisions, an adjacent programme to upgrade the Warrior Armoured Infantry Vehicle (which was originally designed and made by BAE Land Systems) with the same new 40mm Cannon as Ajax (designed by BAES Land Systems) was awarded to Lockheed Martin UK. It was astonishing that DE&S were awarding the upgrade of Warrior to a different company than the people that made it (BAE Land Systems, the Design Authority). It would be a bit like asking Ford to replace the engines on a fleet of Toyotas, using Vauxhall to make the engines, but having to go back to Toyota for technical interface documents. This was, at best, naive on the part of those that made the decisions to think that it could work, given the challenge of the systems integration ahead of them. Again, it was obvious then and not something for hindsight, that the Army was lining itself up for a fall. We looked on in consternation that collectively the MoD had knowingly made a decision that would cause BAE Land Systems to, in effect, run down their factories for UK armoured vehicle production in places like Telford and Newcastle. It was British industrial suicide, yet the government did nothing to stop the decision. You could not make it up in terms of poor decision making.

Orders, Leadership and Loyalty

Much that I, and others, questioned the decisions, we knew that once contractual commitments had been made, we had to follow the Army party line and make Ajax and the Warrior Upgrade contracts work. Additionally, from my own experience of FRES some eight years previously, I knew it would make little difference. I was now in a newly formed directorate within the newly forming Army HQ, that was attempting to re-establish the capability of Combined Arms Manoeuvre (which had been mothballed to focus on the needs of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan). Furthermore, I knew that a number of senior officers in the Ajax chain of command had been ‘FRES Acolytes’ in many of their previous appointments and any challenge would be overruled. There is a saying in the Army that once a decision has been made, then the job of the chain of command is to ‘turn to the right’ (a parade square drill analogy) and carry out the orders. This is where loyalty can go wrong. Thus, as I was the officer in charge of putting together the overall capability plan for Ajax in those early years, there was either the choice of resignation or do to make the best with a plan that looked doomed to fail. I spent two years trying my best to make it work, but realised that this was not something I could influence to success in that short timeframe. In 2014, I left the Army.

2019 – Boxer Returns (one of the better decisions), but the Dogs of War Retire

In a twist of irony (but perhaps a good news story), in 2019, the Army decided to re-commence the Boxer vehicle programme, Investment has come back to Telford (now a partnership of what was BAE Land Systems and the German defence company Rheinmetall, called RBSL) and other industrial sites. However, in further bad news, after deciding to invest and use an effective and well protected fleet of hundreds of modern, wheeled armoured vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan (the Dogs of War), which had so much low cost future potential, many were then disposed of, or not supported logistically. This was frustrating and a classic case of not being able to seize an opportunity. After all, many of these types of vehicles are performing well in Ukraine and the Middle East. With these Dogs of War, we were closer to what we wanted than we thought.

2020-2025 – Bad Vibrations and Hard Decisions for Ajax

Today, at the end of 2025, the future of the entire Ajax programme hangs in the balance. Whilst Ajax could still prove to be a highly capable heavy armoured vehicle, there are huge hurdles to clear, not least the military and public perception of the vehicle. Over the last ten years it has gone from one problem to another, beset by delays, cost overruns, technical problems, inter-company contractual problems, defining its role (was it armoured reconnaissance, or Armoured Cavalry, ‘Strike Concept’ or a light tank?), issues over its large size (making it vulnerable from drones and missiles) and of course, the enormous cost. However, more significantly and more recently from around 2021, a major problem arose that no one was expecting, and that was one of injuries being sustained by soldiers trialling the vehicle, with a likely cause of excessive vibration. Although since then there have been investigations and modifications, it does not appear that the cause of the injuries to soldiers has been either fixed nor even found, as more soldiers have suffered in recent exercises in November 2025. Without defining the problem (and then coming up with a plan to fix it properly), the programme, at this late stage, risks being cancelled. Government led enquiries are currently ongoing. Yet the investment of £5bn into Ajax makes it all the harder to think of cancellation.

Double Trouble and Decision Ahead

To make the Ajax decision even harder, in 2021 the Warrior upgrade programme (known as WR CSP) was cancelled and tracked armoured infantry, as a capability, was given early retirement. So if cancellation is the option taken, the Army risks having neither Ajax nor Warrior in the years to come. All this comes at a time when NATO is insisting that countries bolster their land forces and where the British Army has become too small (read ‘Marching Below Critical Mass’). This all leaves a huge decision for not just senior leaders in the Army, but also those at DE&S, MoD Main Building and of course, the Government itself.

Culture and Behaviours

In an organisation like an army, part of the problem is that those in charge are also responsible for both developing and promoting those under their charge. It makes a genuine change in culture almost impossible. Most aspiring commanders know only too well that the best way to advance their career is to behave like their seniors, think like their seniors and agree with their decisions. It was Orson Scott-Card, the American science fiction writer who summed this up well by saying, ““Every Officer learns how to function within the system that promoted them.” Getting changes in MoD policy, strategy or programmes is often known as trying to turn a super tanker. That is alright when you are fighting the Cold War of 1950-1990, where most decisions require a long-term outlook and for good reason. However, it is not so healthy when the situation changes, when there is surprise or something unexpected and when new ideas, fresh thinking and bold decisions are needed to make the necessary changes. So thinking back to my own experiences in the corridors of power in the Ministry of Defence, how can anyone learn lessons from the debacle of the procurement of armoured vehicles over the past 25 years, if no one recognises and accepts that mistakes were made?

System at Fault – Shake it Up

I can honestly say that most people in the MoD that I came across were trying to do the right thing for Defence and for their country. It was the system that they worked in that was at fault. What is needed is better decision making. That requires improved awareness and understanding, expertise, objective opinion from outside the group. Ultimately, it was about better behaviours. Colonel John Boyd, arguably the greatest fighter pilot and innovator the USAF ever had, spent his career disagreeing with poor decisions being made by the US Department of Defence on designs of new fighter aircraft. He once told a colleague who was feeling the heat from his own military bosses for taking a different stand on aircraft design which was going to deny him promotion, “Do you want to be part of the system, or do you want to shake up the system?”[2] The answer was of course, was to shake up the system. The problem was that the military hierarchy and its system of reward and promotion encouraged group think and prevented anyone from speaking truth to power. It is only when the chips are down and people’s lives are directly at stake, like when military commanders are allowed to deliver effective equipment quickly (the UOR process), or when deployed on combat operations, that things tend to change, and the decision making gets better. And this possibly explains why the British Military is on the one hand highly regarded for their operational and tactical prowess, planning ability, innovation and decision making in battle (i.e., crisis management), yet poor at long term, peacetime procurement.

Conclusion

Militaries tend to be very good at identifying lessons, but unless they are on combat operations, they tend to be less adept at learning lessons and doing something about it. FRES and Ajax are classic examples. We often hear about a big new report or initiative on military procurement, conducted by either an eminent KC or a top flight business consultancy, that promises to deliver change and improvements. The same goes for the MoD’s restructuring of departments. However, it is hard to pinpoint even one initiative that gets close to changing the culture, improving decision making and ultimately delivering military capability on time and within costs. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Ajax armoured vehicle procurement problems did not start one, five or even ten years ago, they go back over 20 years, perhaps longer.
Perhaps, given that nothing seems to prevent poor armoured vehicle procurement, the Army should just rely on the UOR process and procure its armoured vehicle requirement after ‘the next conflict’ has started, such as they eventually did during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. It would be a huge risk to take, given that without equipment, you cannot write the tactics, nor can an army train properly. Moreover, these were ‘wars of choice’ and where there was time, the resource and the ability to order the UORs. In a future conflict, time may not be a luxury that the Army, nor the country will have – and that brings to mind the quote, “There’s nothing as expensive as cheap insurance.”

Front page photograph of Ajax: UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023
[1] A report written for the MoD by Lord Levene, recommending the delegation of budgets to single Services. It made sense and was a step forward (but sadly, recent history shows that it neither changed behaviours nor outcomes.)
[2] Extract from Boyd, the Fighter Pilot who changed the Art of War by Robert Coram.

Col Fullerton OBE served in the British Army for 28 years. He was the Commanding Officer of the Household Cavalry Regiment between 2008 and 2011, which included a six month operational tour in Afghanistan. In his last post, Col Fullerton served as Assistant Head of Directorate Combat in Army Headquarters.