China and Britain clash over nuclear fuel for Australian submarines

China has accused Britain and the United States of breaching nuclear non-proliferation rules by supplying Australia with highly enriched uranium for its future submarine fleet.

The claim was rejected by the British government at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, where a British diplomat described Beijing’s allegations as “politically motivated” and “false”.

The dispute centres on the Aukus security agreement, under which Australia will acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines using British and American technology.

Chinese officials have repeatedly placed the issue before the IAEA’s board of governors and argue that supplying weapons-grade nuclear material to Australia, a non-nuclear-weapon state, creates a loophole in international safeguards.

Li Song, China’s ambassador to the IAEA, told the board this month that the issue had now been considered on 24 consecutive occasions by the agency’s board and general conference since Aukus was announced in 2021.

Li said: “AUKUS is a strategic military nuclear cooperation between two nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear-weapon military ally.”

He added: “It is unprecedented in the history of the NPT and the IAEA.”

China’s principal objection relates to the highly enriched uranium, or HEU, used to fuel American and British nuclear-powered submarines.

Li told the board that American nuclear submarines carried more than 200kg of uranium enriched to more than 90 per cent.

He said: “Should Article 14 of the CSA be applied to AUKUS, it would mean that tons of weapons-grade HEU would be removed from IAEA physical inventory verification for decades.”

Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA allows nuclear material to be used in certain non-explosive military activities outside normal safeguards procedures.

Australia is negotiating with the IAEA over how the provision will apply to its submarine programme.

Li said Article 14 had never previously been invoked by a state party during the half-century in which comprehensive safeguards agreements had operated.

He also rejected the Aukus countries’ argument that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permitted the transfer of nuclear material at any level of enrichment.

“The transfer of nuclear materials to a non-nuclear-weapon state for military purposes is without precedent in the history of the NPT and the IAEA,” he said.

Britain responded on behalf of all three Aukus members.

Sonia Farrey, the British representative, told the board on September 10 that Australia’s submarine programme was “fully consistent with the letter and spirit of the NPT and the global safeguards framework”.

She accused China of making “unsubstantiated claims” and said: “China has repeatedly used this Board agenda item to promote a political narrative.”

Farrey added: “We continue to question the utility of China’s item. It is politically motivated and has never enjoyed consensus.”

Britain also rejected suggestions that nuclear material supplied to Australia would escape effective international supervision.

Farrey said naval nuclear propulsion had been anticipated when the non-proliferation system was created and that Article 14 was specifically intended to allow states to use nuclear material for naval propulsion within the safeguards framework.

She said: “The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level provided the transfer is not for nuclear weapons and is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations.”

Australia has repeatedly stated that its submarines will carry conventional weapons and that it will not acquire nuclear weapons.

Britain also said any agreement reached between Australia and the IAEA over Article 14 would be presented to the agency’s board.

Farrey said: “Suggestions that the Board will be bypassed are categorically false.”

Negotiations between Australia and the IAEA remain under way.

Mathew Fox, Australia’s alternate representative to the agency, told the board in June that discussions included the proposed safeguards system, new nuclear facilities and the areas in which nuclear material would be accounted for.

He said consultations on an Article 14 arrangement “remain ongoing”.

Under the Aukus programme, American and British nuclear-powered submarines are due to begin operating regularly from HMAS Stirling in Western Australia from 2027.

Australia then plans to acquire three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States from the early 2030s, subject to American approval.

The longer-term programme involves Australia and Britain building a new class of SSN-Aukus submarines.

Australia plans eventually to operate eight nuclear-powered submarines.

Farrey said visits by British and American submarines to Australia were intended to prepare Australian personnel to operate and maintain the vessels.

“These visits are consistent with AUKUS partners’ international obligations,” she told the IAEA board.

China has indicated that it will continue to press for the safeguards arrangements to be debated by IAEA member states.

Li called for what he described as “an open, inclusive and sustainable intergovernmental process” to deal with the issue.