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President Trump leads new U.S.–Nigeria counterterrorism alliance
An op-ed on lawful partnership, civilian protection, and dismantling narco-terror revenue, by Andre Pienaar.
Maps
Map 1. Nigeria and Sokoto State (northwest operational area).
Map 2. The Sahel belt across Africa (regional operating environment).
Source: Munion, “Map of the Sahel,” Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.
On December 25, 2025, US Africa Command announced that, at the direction of the President of the United States and in coordination with Nigerian authorities, US forces conducted strikes against ISIS camps in Sokoto State, with an initial assessment that multiple ISIS operatives were killed. Counter-terrorism works best when as in this case it is coordinated with allies and grounded in shared intelligence.
With the displacement of ISIS bases from the Middle East to Africa, and the withdrawal of the French military from West Africa and the pullout of the British Army from Mali followed by the failed security model of the Russian Wagner Group, the new US-Nigeria counter-terrorism alliance deserves support from the Africa Union and the international community. It is not merely a bilateral security relationship but a regional stability partnership. Nigeria sits at the centre of West Africa’s security equation and is a vital partner against the growing threat of ISIS in the region. When Nigeria is more resilient, the country’s neighbours are safer, when insecurity spreads, displacement, trafficking, and extremist cross-border mobility are fuelled.
The US under President Trump’s leadership plays a crucial role in Africa’s stability and security across the Continent from negotiating the end of the resurgent war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to stability operations in the Horn of Africa.
A Responsibility to Protect (R2P) approach from the US begins with a simple moral and strategic claim governments have a duty to protect civilians from mass violence and predation, and responsible partners should help states meet that duty when asked and when doing so is lawful and precise. Nigeria leads the fight against terrorism on its own territory. The US’ Department of War provides vital capabilities that save time and lives and provides kinetic reach, including intelligence support, precision options, and technical assistance aimed at disrupting transnational financing and logistics.
Islamist terrorism has become inseparable from the global narcotics trade. In West Africa and the Sahel region, ISIS-aligned factions often do not need to run the narcotics trade to profit from it. They frequently operate like predatory tax authorities, earning money by controlling terrain and extracting payments from criminal commerce that already moves through ungoverned space tolls on roads, coercive “protection fees” at markets, and levies at informal crossing points.
This convergence of terrorism and organised crime is not a theoretical risk. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has warned that terrorist groups can finance themselves through criminal activity, including drug trafficking and related smuggling, and that route control and taxation-like practices can become major revenue sources. A checkpoint, a “fee” for passage, or a coerced levy at a market can generate repeatable income that funds recruitment, bribery, and weapons purchases.
At the same time, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has highlighted the Sahel’s growing role as a trafficking corridor globally with surging seizures – notably cocaine and cannabis resin – and the corrosive effects on governance. Where trafficking expands, corruption follows; where corruption grows, citizens lose faith in the state; and where legitimacy erodes, extremists find their easiest recruiting pitch.
For Washington and Abuja, the implication is straightforward counter-terrorism should be designed to collapse the revenue model that sustains extremist violence. The goal is not only to remove operatives from the battlefield, but to make it harder for terrorist networks to pay fighters, buy weapons, move supplies, and reconstitute after setbacks.
Three practical priorities can turn that concept into action.
First, tighten the intelligence-to-disruption pipeline against illicit logistics. If extremists profit by taxing transit, then target the network routes, storage sites, transport intermediaries, facilitators, and cash couriers. Joint fusion cells that link Nigerian ground truth with US analytical capacity can identify high-value nodes and support Nigerian-led operations to seize goods, dismantle staging sites, and remove violent gatekeepers from key corridors.
Second, scale counter-terror finance tools with the same urgency as battlefield targeting. FATF has emphasised how terrorists exploit cash-based economies and informal value transfer mechanisms. Nigeria and the United States can deepen cooperation on financial intelligence, investigative support, and sanctions-style measures against facilitators who knowingly move funds for violent extremists. When financiers and fixers face real consequences, the operational tempo of terror networks drops.
Third, keep civilian protection and national cohesion at the centre of the mission. Nigeria’s security challenge is complex and affects communities of many faiths and backgrounds. The most dangerous gift to extremists is a narrative of inevitable sectarian conflict. A successful counter-terrorism partnership will prioritise the actual target terrorist actors who murder civilians, extort communities, and undermine the security and stability of the state.
This is also why transparency and accountability matter. Precision is not only a military preference; it is a legitimacy requirement. Credible assessments of civilian harm, shared after-action learning, and clear public communication help prevent disinformation from turning lawful operations into enemy propaganda.
The US-Nigeria alliance has an opportunity to model a modern approach to counter-terrorism one that respects sovereignty, uses precision to minimise harm, and attacks the financial lifelines that let extremist groups persist. If the partnership expands from strikes to systems – from camps to cashflows – it can strengthen West Africa’s resilience against the next wave of violent extremism.
That is what a Responsibility to Protect approach should look like in practice protect lives today, and dismantle the criminal economies that endanger lives tomorrow.
