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By Isabella Egerton
India has sent a 65-strong contingent, including troops from the Kumaon Regiment, to Russia’s Zapad-2025 military exercises, a move sources told National Security News is being interpreted within NATO as a provocative step amid rising tensions with Moscow.
The drills involve around 30,000 Russian and Belarusian soldiers and include missile launches, large-scale manoeuvres, and simulated airstrikes from the Arctic to western Belarus near NATO’s eastern frontier.
The Indian Ministry of Defence said the troops are stationed at the Mulino training ground, roughly 40 miles west of Nizhny Novgorod, well away from NATO borders. Delhi described the deployment as a way to “further strengthen defence co-operation and foster camaraderie between India and Russia,” with personnel participating in “joint training, tactical drills and special arms skills” alongside Russian forces.
India has long maintained strategic autonomy, avoiding full alignment with great powers while keeping close military ties with Moscow and remaining a major purchaser of Russian arms. It has attended previous Zapad exercises before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and other Russian war games since. Analysts say the latest participation is a concerning signal amid current geopolitical tensions.
Dr Walter Ladwig, RUSI Associate Fellow, International Security, told National Security News: “India’s participation in Zapad should be read less as a signal to Washington than as an act of balance. New Delhi has long made a point of attending Russia’s multilateral exercises — Zapad in 2021, Vostok in 2022 — and the small Indian contingent in 2025 is very much in line with that pattern. It reflects India’s determination to maintain a working defence relationship with Moscow, which still supplies a large share of its military hardware, even as it deepens operational ties with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners. This is a symbolic reaffirmation of legacy ties with Moscow, not a departure from its broader effort to balance relationships with both Western and Indo-Pacific partners.”
He added: “A company-sized detachment at Mulino does not alter the military balance or blunt NATO’s efforts to isolate Russia. It does underscore India’s unwillingness to join that isolation — a reflection of its strategic autonomy and the continuing importance of Russian-origin equipment. India’s participation in Zapad is a textbook example of its balancing act: with the United States and its allies, New Delhi conducts its largest exercises for genuine interoperability; with Russia, it maintains smaller, largely symbolic engagements; and with China, it engages only in limited border management mechanisms. Taken together, this reflects India’s strategy of strategic autonomy: preserving Moscow ties, expanding partnerships with Washington and Indo-Pacific allies, and keeping options open in a contested neighbourhood.”
David Merkel, an American geostrategy consultant who previously led the Europe and Eurasia divisions at the US State Department, told The Times: “What does India gain strategically from participating in Zapad at this exact moment — is Modi signalling to Washington, or simply reaffirming an old Moscow tie? India’s active participation, following the drone incursion on Poland and chilling relations with Washington, raises concerns about the future extent of the US-India security relationship. [It] demonstrates the priority New Delhi places on its relations with Moscow, something Modi is leaning on more given the uncertainty of his relationship with President Trump.”
Ulrich Speck, a German foreign policy analyst, said India had “crossed a red line,” while Finnish strategic foresight expert Sari Arho Havren called the involvement “terrible optics”.
Recent NATO tensions, including drone incursions into Poland and Romania, have prompted the alliance to reinforce its eastern air defences. US-India relations continue to be shaped by trade disputes and the challenge of balancing ties with Moscow. Dr Ladwig stressed that India’s participation is unlikely to derail defence or intelligence cooperation with Washington: “US policymakers are accustomed to India’s balancing behaviour. Episodes like this may frustrate Washington politically, but they are unlikely to slow the steady growth of US–India defence collaboration. If anything, tariffs on Indian goods or public attacks by political actors are likely to do more to retard cooperation than a small Indian contingent training in Russia.”
